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ABSTRACT 
The paper first summarises some of the economic and social characteristics of the evolving world 
scenario, and their relevance for globalization, economic development and foreign direct investment. It 
then goes on to identify and discuss the main components of the competitive strengths and weaknesses 
of the Korean economy and of Korean firms; and finally examines the implications of these findings for 
outward and inward foreign direct investment policy. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The main task of this paper is to summarise the current state of scholarly thinking on 
the extent to which, and the ways in which, the globalisation of economic activity is 
affecting our understanding about the causes and effects of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the competitiveness of Korean firms. 
Inevitably, because of space limitations, I shall have to be very selective in the issues I 
cover.  
That being said, my primary focus will be on identifying general trends and their 
policy implications – rather than on those uniquely relevant to Korean firms and 
policy makers. In doing so, I will highlight the main thrust and conclusions of 
scholarly research on four issues. First, I shall identify some of the critical 
characteristics of our contemporary world economy. Second I shall describe the 
interface between, and offer some facts about, globalisation, development and FDI. 
Third, I shall present some data on the competitiveness of the Korean economy and 
of Korean firms. Fourth, in the light of these findings, I shall offer some suggestions 
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of what to my mind, are the critical components of FDI policy which the Korean - 
and, for that matter, most other governments - need to focus on in these early years of 
the 21st century if they wish to advance their various economic and social agenda. 
 
 
THE EVOLVING WORLD SCENARIO 
We live in a world characterised by the geographical spread of market based economic 
democracy, tempered to some degree or other by the intervention of national and 
supranational regimes to protect or enhance extra-market political or social objectives. 
We live in a world in which there is increasing cross border interconnectivity 
between human beings and organisations. While such interconnectivity offers a huge 
potential for economic progress and social intercourse among the peoples of the 
world, it is frequently uneven in its content and outcome, and can lead to a less than a 
rather more hospitable human environment. 
We live in a world of economic and political turbulence; where change, volatility 
and complexity are among its endemic features. 
We live in a world in which continuous advances in all kinds of knowledge and 
falling communication costs are dramatically reconfiguring our economic landscape; 
and the fabric of our daily lives. 
We live in a world replete with paradoxes and tensions. Globalisation brings with it 
its own ‘yang’ and ‘yin’: where convergence and divergence, uniformity and diversity, 
competition and cooperation, centralisation and decentralisation, and individualism 
and communitarianism go hand in hand. 
We live in a world in which the goals and content of human development are 
being reappraised. Compared with the past, more attention is now being paid to the 
social, cultural and ideological wellbeing of individuals and communities, and also to 
the moral imperatives of wealth creating activities. 
We live in a world in which the global competitive position of corporations and 
countries is increasingly dependent on their success in establishing, and learning from, 
cross border partnerships and strategic alliances, and of being part of a global network 
of related activities. 
We live in a world in which the content and quality of the incentive structures 
and belief systems of countries and firms are increasingly influencing societal attitudes 
towards the purpose and content of economic development strategies, and to the 
social responsibilities of both private and public decision taking entities. 
In short, we live in a world in which the human and physical global environment 
underpinning the strategies of corporations, and the policies of national governments, 
is undergoing fundamental structural change. And it is the corporations and 
governments which are most able to respond to and benefit from these changes, and 
which are best equipped to minimise or counteract the disruptive effects of them, that 
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are the most likely to succeed in today’s hugely competitive global village. 
 
 
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN GLOBALISATION, 
DEVELOPMENT AND FDI 
What then is the relevance of these characteristics for globalisation and for economic 
development? What role does FDI play in both fashioning and reacting to these 
characteristics? What (in our present context) are the implications for the Korean 
economy and for Korean firms? 
The circles in Figure 1 demonstrate how these three concepts interface with each 
other. The rectangles surrounding the circles identify the main decision-taking entities 
in contemporary economies. As I have already indicated, the majority of economic 
transactions in most countries - including Korea - are undertaken through markets, 
but the extent to which, and the ways in which, these markets are supported, 
influenced or controlled by the actions of extra market actors vary considerably. 
Compare, for example, the economic governance and institutions of the U.S. and 
China, or those of Brazil and Taiwan in this respect. 
 
Figure 1. The Globalisation/Development/FDI triad 
Interest Groups (NGOs)
National Governments
Supranational Entities
Market Participants
Globalisation Development
FDI
 
 
In this contribution I will concentrate primarily on the role of two of the key 
actors - corporations (and particularly MNEs) and national governments. 
 
Globalisation 
Let me briefly summarise some of the main attributes of 21st century globalisation. 
Essentially this phenomenon is best thought of as the interconnectivity of people and 
organisations across the planet. Such connectivity may be shallow or deep, short or 
long lasting. It may be geared towards promoting personal or organisational interests, 
 
FALL 2006 3
 
 
FDI, GLOBALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREAN ECONOMY AND KOREAN 
FIRMS 
 
and to advancing economic, cultural or political goals. Its main outcome is an 
increasing and deepening interdependence between otherwise geographically 
segmented human and physical environments. 
E-commerce and the internet are the quintessential indices of globalisation. But 
there are many others, such as the extent and geography of cross border travel, the 
media (especially TV coverage), technology and financial flows, and people movement. 
At the same time, it is worth noting that few organisations, public or private, are fully 
global in their activities. Most large MNEs, for example, still confine the greater part 
of their value added activities to two of the five continents of the globe (Rugman & 
Verbeke 2004).  
Globalisation, in and of itself, is a neutral concept. But it can be used to advance 
good or bad goals or to achieve good or bad effects. The ‘yang’ of globalisation is that 
it can raise incomes, transfer ideas and knowledge, open up new markets, and 
promote more dialogue and understanding among different cultures. The ‘yin’ of 
globalisation is that it can lead to more volatility and uncertainty, and more disruption 
in people’s lives. It can also facilitate the international movement of ‘bads’ such as 
drugs, crime and terrorism.  
In the maximisation of the positive and the minimisation of the negative 
consequences of globalisation, extra market decision takers have a critical role to play. 
For example, the fact that globalisation is not as inclusive, or as equitable in its 
outcome as it might be, is often due less to the inadequacies of markets, and more to 
differences in the institutional artefacts underpinning these markets, and of 
inappropriate actions taken by national governments or supranational agencies.  
One final point about globalisation is the growing role of multi-stakeholders 
(notably NGOs, consumer activists, shareholders and labour unions), in influencing 
its content and consequences – and particularly so in respect of the intranational 
distribution of its key resources and capabilities, and of its end products. 
 
Economic Development 
What next of the contemporary thinking about purposes and content of economic 
development? Key among the new or revised ideas are those about the composition, 
determinants and form of development. No longer are crude and single measures such 
as gross domestic product (GDP) per head acceptable. Increasingly those which 
emphasise quality of life measures, such as safety and security, good health, reduced 
infant mortality, educational achievement, and overall wellbeing are increasingly being 
sought. The tiny kingdom of Bhutan, for example, has compiled a GDP of ‘happiness’. 
This reflects the increasing attention being paid by national governments both to 
the social needs and the cultural liberty of the individuals and communities for which 
they are responsible. In an age of global branding and the cross border standardisation 
of many goods and services, it also suggests a yearning for more local ownership of 
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critical assets, ideas and institutions; of more multi-stakeholder involvement in policy 
formation; and of more consensus related decision taking. 
All contemporary data point to substantial progress having being made over the 
past two decades in upgrading living standards, and in reducing levels of extreme 
poverty in most developing countries. According to the World Bank the share of the 
population of developing countries in abject poverty (defined as those living on less 
than 1$ a day) fell from one-third in the mid-1980s to one quarter in the early 2000s 
(World Bank 2004). There have also been noticeable improvements in the quality of 
life, e.g. health provision, life expectancy, adult literacy and human rights, and in 
gender related development and the physical environment.  
At the same time, there are other areas of the life style of people which are giving 
more cause for concern. Along with (though not necessarily the result of) rising living 
standards and increasing behavioural freedom, has come more terrorism, crime, 
corruption, drug trafficking and social disorder, with all the disbenefits and 
uncertainties associated with those. 
Development then, first and foremost, needs to be viewed as a holistic and multi 
dimensional concept. Its contents and implementation involve multi-stakeholder 
initiatives. Its determinants are multi-causal; its effects are multi-faceted. 1  
At the same time, although it is possible to identify many common elements in 
the design and implementation of development strategies, each country has its own 
particular economic and social agenda, and is a creature of its own unique cultural 
heritage. Each country too has its distinctive institutions, forms of governance and 
voice mechanisms. And it is from such varied perspectives as these that MNEs have 
to evaluate and choose between the investment opportunities offered by different 
locations and national regimes. 
 
FDI 
What now of FDI as an instrument for upgrading national competitiveness and 
promoting structural change?  
The recent growth in FDI stocks has closely paralleled that of globalisation. 
According to UNCTAD (2005) between 1990 and 2004, the combined world inward 
and outward FDI stocks increased 5.2 times (from $3,534 billion to $18,628 billion). 
The corresponding growth rates for Korea and nine of the leading East Asian 
economies2 were 8.8 and 11.4 respectively. In 1990, the inward FDI stocks into Korea 
were equal to 2.1% of its GDP; by 2004 this figure had risen to 8.1. The 
corresponding ratios for outward FDI stock were 1.6% and 5.8% respectively 
                                                 
1 These aspects of development are more fully explored in Dunning (2006). 
2 These were China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Thailand. 
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(UNCTAD 2005). FDI today is not only the most important component of trans-
border economic activity; it is also one of the most critical shapers of the international 
division of labour, of economic restructuring, and of the life styles of men and women 
across the planet. 
It is now estimated that MNEs currently account for three quarters of all global 
innovating activity and spending on human resource development (UNCTAD 2005); 
increasingly, they are decentralising such higher value activities to their foreign 
affiliates and particularly so within higher and middle income countries. In most 
instances, this is to be welcomed, since the speed at which countries can move up 
their development ladders is increasingly resting on the quality of the human and 
physical assets, and the enterprise and vision of their firms and people. However, the 
benefits which a particular country derives from the operations of the affiliates of 
foreign MNEs in its midst, and from its activities of its own firms outside their 
national boundaries, is highly contingent on the quality and content of its social and 
institutional capital, and of its belief systems and cultural preferences. It also depends 
on its stage of economic development. As set out in Table 1 it is possible to identify at 
least four stages in a country’s investment and trade development paths (IDP & 
TDPs). I believe Korea as well as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan is in, 
or is approaching, Stage 4 of its economic development. Further justification for this 
belief is set out in Dunning, Kim and Lin (2001). 
 
Table 1. Four Stages in the IDP & TDPs of Industrializing Developing 
Countries 
 
Stage 1. Low Resource & Capability Base- Underdeveloped 
Domestic Markets 
 
Stage 2. Improving Resource & Capability Base- Rising Domestic 
Markets 
 
Stage 3. Human Capital and Indigenous Innovatory Base Now 
Becoming Significant- Rising Domestic Markets 
 
Stage 4. Approaching Mature Industrialization : Relatively Rich and 
Sophisticated Markets 
 
 
THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY AND 
KOREAN FIRMS 
What now of the competitiveness of Korea’s economy and that of Korean firms? 
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Here I make use of some data comprising the Global Competitive Index (GCI) devised by 
Sala-I Martin and Artadi (2005).3 This index is, itself, based on a combination of 118 
individual measures of competitiveness identified by the Global Competitive Report, 
which is published annually by the World Economic Forum. 
The GCI pinpoints (what it calls) 12 pillars of competitiveness and ranks each of 
some 104 countries by this criteria. The first five pillars consist of a group of 50 
variables making up a country’s basic economic and social infrastructure. The second 
five are best described as business facilitating indices: they comprise 52 separate 
components. The third group of 2 pillars contains 16 indices which largely reflect the 
competitive enhancing qualities of corporations and supporting organizations. 
 
Table 2. Ranking of Global Competitive Indices for Korean Economy and 
Firms 2004 
  Korea Taiwan Rest of Asia 
  (a) (b) (a) (a) 
A. Basic infrastructure indices 25 5 23 31
1. Institutions 50 7 22 35 
2. Physical infrastructure 23 5 21 37 
3. Macro environment 4 2 29 24 
4. Security 32 5 31 46 
5(a) Basic human capital 29 2 72 63 
B. Business facilitating indices 26 5 23 31
5(b) Advanced human capital 22 4 5 42 
6 Goods market efficiency 28 4 5 35 
7 Labour market efficiency 85 9 7 29 
8 Financial market efficiency 67 7 30 45 
9 Technological readiness 11 3 9 39 
10 Openness and market 9 2 14 22 
C Corporate competitiveness indices 22 4 7 33
11 Business facilitation  23 4 11 35
12 Innovating capabilities 20 4 8 34
 Global competitiveness index 26 5 11 32
(a) Rank out of 104 countries. (b) Rank out of 9 East Asian Countries (China, Hong Kong 
(SAR), Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.) 
Source: World Economic Forum (2004) 
 
                                                 
3 The index is made up of ‘hard’ statistical data provided by national authorities and/or 
supranational organizations; and the opinions of some 8729 business executives from firms of 
different sizes in each of 104 countries (Blanke and Loades 2004). 
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In Table 2, we set out Korea’s position for 2004, alongside that of Taiwan and 
the rest of East Asia (apart from Japan). Overall in that year, Korea was ranked 26th 
(of the 104 countries) in its overall global competitiveness. This compared with a rank 
of 11 for Taiwan and 32 (on average) for other countries in East Asia. Among the 
nine East Asian countries, Korea is ranked 5th, behind Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Malaysia, but above China, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
What are Korea’s unique competitive strengths and weaknesses? Some of these 
are set out in Table 3 and 4.  
 
Table 3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Korean Economy and Korean Firms 
2004* 
 Ranking1   Ranking1
 (a) (b)   (a) (b) 
   BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE/INSTITUTIONS 25 5 
Legal framework relating to ICT 14 3 • Irregular payments  50→63 5 
• Internet access schools 3 1 • Public sector ethics 69,77,.85 8,8,8 
• Tertiary education  3 2 • Regulatory burdens 66,67 8, 8 
• Fiscal prudence 7, 6 1, 1 • Effectiveness of legal bodies 81 8 
• ICT prioritization 14 3    
   BUSINESS FACILITATING INDICES 26 5 
• Local competition 2 1 • Availability of finance 52, 69, 81 7,8,8 
• ISP competition 3 1 • Availability of scientists/engineers 52 5 
• Buyer sophistication 10 11 • Quality of business schools 58  
• Local suppliers 11 2 • Soundness of banks 77 7 
   • Foreign ownership restrictions 69, 8 5, 7 
   • Ease of hiring foreign labour 99 9 
   • Employment of women 98, 102 9, 9 
   • FDI contribution to technology 63, 65 8, 8 
   CORPORATE COMPETITIVENESS 22 4 
• Environment management  9 2 • Reliance on professional management 58 6 
• Customer orientation  12 3 • Hiring/Firing practices 73 8 
• Spending on R&D 14 3 • Corporate ethics 51 7 
• Technology absorption 14 4 • Labour relations 103 9 
• Capacity for innovation 15 2    
* Most other competitive indices (e.g. property rights, were around average). 
1. (a) Rank out of 104 countries. (b) Rank out of 9 East Asian countries. Sometimes there are 
multiple components of the same indices. 
2. ICT Information Communications Technology. Source: World Economic Forum (2004) 
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Table 4. Scores and Ranking for Effectiveness of Government Related 
Institutions 2004 
 Voice & 
Accountability 
Political 
Stability
Government 
Effectiveness
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
Average 
China  -1.54 9 -0.07 6 0.15 7 -0.45 9 0.47 6 -0.51 7 -0.53 8 
Hong Kong  0.21 4 1.3 2 1.49 2 1.89 1 1.42 2 1.57 2 1.31 2 
Indonesia  -0.44 7 -1.38 9 -0.36 9 -0.42 8 -0.91 9 -0.9 9 -0.74 9 
Korea  0.73 2 0.45 4 0.95 5 0.69 4 0.67 4 0.17 5 0.61 4 
Malaysia  -0.36 8 0.38 5 0.99 4 0.44 5 0.52 5 0.29 4 0.37 5 
Philippines  0.02 5 -1.01 8 -0.23 8 -0.06 7 0.62 8 -0.55 8 -0.41 7 
Singapore  -0.13 6 1.48 1 2.25 1 1.87 2 1.82 11 2.44 1 1.62 1 
Taiwan  0.95 1 0.52 3 1.15 3 1.29 3 0.83 3 0.64 3 0.9 3 
Thailand  0.24 3 -0.15 7 0.38 6 -0.01 6 -0.05 7 -0.25 6 0.03 6 
NB. Average of all indicators for the nine East Asian countries is 0.41. This compares with an 
average for six of the leading Latin American countries of -0.97. 
Source: Adapted from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). 
 
In Table 3 Korea’s advantages are seen to be concentrated in competitive pillars 
3, 9, 5B, 11 and 12, while its major weaknesses are in 1, 4, 7 and 8. In all indices, 
Taiwan is more highly ranked than Korea, and particularly so in those to do with 
corporate competitiveness. But Korea is more highly ranked than the rest of East Asia 
in all indices in pillars 1, 7, 8. 
Further details of the more specific areas of competitiveness in which Korea and 
Korean firms are shown to have comparative strengths and weaknesses are identified 
in Table 4. The contents of this table are fairly self evident. They again highlight the 
relatively strong position of Korean firms and Korean institutions in technology 
related and knowledge enhancing activities; and too, in the importance attached to 
demands of buyers and the quality of suppliers in the value chain. But they also 
identify a wide range of institutional deficiencies. These include, at a macro-level, the 
(perceived) lack of accessibility to, and quality of, various kinds of finance, public 
sector ethics, the effectiveness of legal entities, and the role of women in the 
workplace. At a corporate level, the main weaknesses pinpointed are the inadequacies 
of relational capital, e.g. with respect to the quality or effectiveness of labour relations, 
hiring and firing practices, and the reluctance of Korean firms to use external 
professional management services. 
This relative paucity of institutional assets is worthy of more attention, if for no 
other reason than that foreign MNEs are treating the content and quality of these as 
increasingly important influences on their locational strategies. In our research, we 
have isolated 75 of the 177 individual indices (which are identified by the Global 
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Competitiveness Report)4 as institutionally related indices (IRIs). Following Douglass 
North (2005) we broadly define institutions as formal or informal incentive structures 
and enforcement mechanisms, created and/or implemented by private or public 
organisations. The average ranking for Korea of these 75 indices (out of 104 
countries) was 44 compared with 38 in the case of the other competitive related 
indices.5 (i.e. those of a non-institutional kind). Moreover, of the problematic features 
of the Korean economy identified by Korean and foreign owned firms in the 
Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) conducted by the Sala-I-Martin and Artardi (2005) 
four of the most important were examples of institutional deficiencies. 6  Rather 
surprisingly, the five indicators which one would normally expect to influence 
inbound foreign direct investment (FDI),7 (for good or bad) were afforded very low 
rankings by the GCI. The average placing for Korea was 70th (out of 104 countries), 
and 7th of the nine East Asian countries. 
These findings are also largely confirmed by an ambitious study of the 
effectiveness of various public institutions and governmental policies conducted (on 
an annual basis) by the World Bank.8 As set out in Table 4, the authors (Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005) found that, in 2004, of six aggregate governance indicators, 
Korea was ranked second only to Taiwan out of the nine East Asian countries in the 
case of voice and accountability, 4th for political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 5th 
for control of corruption and effectiveness of government.9
In view of these data, it is perhaps not surprising that, in the early 2000s, at least, 
Korea’s willingness or capability to attract inward FDI, was judged by UNCTAD to 
be below what might have been expected from its share of the world’s gross national 
product (GDP) (UNCTAD 2005).10 According to a survey of 140 countries by that 
                                                 
4 These include the 118 indices making up the pillars of competitiveness and 59 additional 
indices relating to the environment and company operations and strategy. 
5 This number embraces a number of specific indicators not included in the calculation of the 
GCI. 
6 Viz. policy instability, restrictive labour regulations, tax regulations, inefficient bureaucracy, 
and access to financing. 
7 There were restrictions on foreign ownership (69) prevalence of foreign licensing (63) FDI as 
a source of new technology (65), impact on business of rules on FDI (81) and the exchange 
rate (63). 
8Embracing 209 countries and several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of 
governance effectiveness. These were drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 
different organizations. 
9 Further details are set out in Table 4. The scores for each estimate are normally distributed 
with a mean (for the 209 countries) of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. 
Virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5 with the higher scores corresponding to better 
outcomes (Kaufmann, Kray & Mastruzzi 2005: 7-8). 
10 According to UNCTAD this FDI performance measure is the share of a country’s inward 
FDI flows to the world firms divided by its share of the world’s GNP. 
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organization, Korea was ranked 120th (and 8th of the 9 East Asian economies)11 in its 
inward investment performance index (IFDI) for the period 2001-2003. Korea’s 
corresponding rankings with respect to outward FDI (OFDI) performance was rather 
better viz at 47 and 5 respectively. Further details are set out in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Ranking of FDI Performance and Prospects of East Asian Economies 
 
Rankings 
 (a) IFDI performance 
2001-2003 
(b) OFDI Performance 
2001-2003 
(c) IFDI Potential 
2004 
IFDI Forecast1  
 of all 
countries 
of E. Asian 
countries 
of all 
countries 
of E. Asian 
countries 
of all 
countries 
of E. Asian 
countries 
% 
change 
of E .Asian 
countries 
China 37 3 58 6 39 6 136.3 8 
Hong Kong 9 2 6 2 12 2 190.3 4 
2 Indonesia 139 9 80 8 82 9 500.02
Korea 120 8 47 5 18 3 187.1 5 
Malaysia 75 4 32 4 32 5 117.8 7 
Philippines 96 6 96 9 57 8 455.6 3 
Singapore 6 1 3 1 4 1 96.7 9 
Taiwan 117 7 24 3 21 4 506.7 1 
Thailand 87 5 62 7 54 7 165.6 
1 Expected growth in VALUE OF IFDI (flows) 2003/4 (100) to 2007/8. 
6 
2 2004 = 100 (2003 figure was a negative). 
Source: Derived from UNCTAD (2005: 274-6) and Economist Intelligence Unit. (2004) 
 
At the same time, the same UNCTAD study revealed that Korea’s potential for 
attracting future inbound FDI was more promising. It was ranked 18th of the 140 
countries, and of the nine East Asian countries its prospects were only bettered by 
Singapore and Hong Kong.12 Further estimates from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2004) about the likely growth of inbound FDI to East Asian countries broadly 
confirm the UNCTAD estimates.13 Between 2003-2004 and 2007-2008, Korea’s IFDI 
flows are predicted to rise by 87.7%. As Table 5 (columns 7 & 8) shows, this assigns 
the country in 5th place as a future East Asian locational attraction. 
What, then, do these data imply for FDI policy, which, though not directly related 
                                                 
11 Based on the value of a whole set of country specific variables many of which are contained 
in the GCI. UNCTAD made no estimate of Korea’s potential for outward FDI. 
12 Both the IFDI performance and the IFDI potential index rankings for Korea have remained 
remarkably stable over the last decade.  
13 The big exception is Singapore where the EIU’s estimates are way out of line with those of 
UNCTAD’s IFDI potential index. 
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to upgrading a country’s locational attractions to (the right kind of) MNE activity, 
indirectly affects the competitiveness of its indigenous firms? It is our contention that, 
should a country desire to attract more inward FDI, and, at the same time, upgrade 
the capabilities and global performance of its own firms, it must give especial focus to 
those incentives (and obstacles) which studies on the locational strategies of MNEs 
have revealed, or are revealing to be the most important. In the case of Korea, as we 
have seen, this suggests that most attention should be directed to encouraging inward 
FDI, into both those sectors and activities in which the Korean economy is shown to 
have a dynamic comparative advantage, and to those in which Korean firms are 
currently performing below their full potential, vis à vis their foreign competitors. 
 
 
FDI POLICY 
What then do I consider to be the most critical ingredients of FDI policy in the early 
21st century, in the light of global economic trends and new scholarly thinking?  
In the following paragraphs I set out eleven propositions. Each, I believe, is of 
particular relevance to countries like Korea in which both inbound and outbound 
MNE activity is playing an increasingly important competitive enhancing role. The 
propositions are based first on my reading of the latest scholarly research on the 
subject; second on the main sources of data such as those contained in UNCTAD’s 
annual World Investment Reports; and third, on a variety of surveys about how business 
executives view the changing nature of determinants and effects of both outward and 
inward FDI. 
In presenting these propositions I believe that it is important that each should be 
considered as part of a coordinated and interactive system of FDI policies; and I offer 
them here as bullet points, and in no particular order of importance. In any case, such 
ordering is likely to be highly contextual, and will vary according to the types of and 
motives for FDI and the particular situation of individual home or host countries. I 
leave it to those who know the Korean economy and Korean firms much better than 
I, to undertake such a ranking for Korea. 
 
1. In seeking to maximise the benefits of globalisation and to promote the kind 
of economic and social development desired, FDI policies are only likely to 
be as effective as are the general macro economic and micro-management 
policies of which they are part. I shall term this the holistic proposition. 
2. Inbound FDI policy must take account of the likely costs and benefits of the 
varying motives for and kinds of MNE activity, as well as the effectiveness of 
different measures to attract new investments. In the early 21st century, most 
attention on the impact of inbound FDI is focusing on linkages and spill-over 
effects e.g. on the competitiveness of indigenous firms, and the promotion of 
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the host country’s dynamic comparative advantage. This is the effects 
proposition. 
3. Inward and outward FDI policy needs to be dynamic, flexible, and 
appropriate to the stage of development of a country. It should be geared to 
ensuring that it helps facilitate the structural upgrading of the country and the 
efficiency of its indigenous firms in a socially acceptable and properly 
sequential way. This is the structural transformation proposition. 
4. FDI policy should to be aware of the constantly changing locational needs of 
foreign investors. In particular, it needs to take account of the growing 
importance of the scope and content of the incentive framework offered by 
host governments in their efforts to foster indigenous entrepreneurship, and 
to assist individuals and corporations to adapt to global change.14 This is the 
institutions proposition. Some of its ingredients are presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Some Institutions Underpinning and Affecting FDI Policy, 
Development and Globalisation 
1.Institutions of economic 
adjustment and stabilisation
2.Institutions strengthening 
economic motivation
3.Institutions of private property 
protection
4. Institutions promoting freedom 
of enterprise
5. Institutions of rule setting and 
societal guidance
6. Institutions promoting 
competition
7. Institutions furthering social 
equity and access to opportunity
FDI
DEVELOPMENT
GLOBALISATION
 
Source: Derived from Rondinelli (2005). 
 
5. As knowledge, embodied in human and physical assets, becomes a more 
important ingredient of a country’s economic competitiveness and its 
restructuring efforts, so FDI policy must address itself to seeking out the best 
                                                 
14 For an examination of the reactions (in 2001) of 60 manufacturing affiliates of foreign 
MNEs to a variety of incentive related measures offered by the Korean government, see Hong 
and Gray (2003). Among those giving the most satisfaction, foreign currency convertibility, 
corporate tax incentives, tax deduction for R&D and accelerated depreciation were among 
those ranked the highest. 
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means of accessing, creating and enhancing physical and human resource 
capabilities. This is the capability upgrading proposition.  
6. By the provision of the appropriate institutions, inbound FDI policy should 
recognise the growing needs of foreign MNEs to form partnerships and 
coalitions with, and/or tap into the assets of networks of, indigenous firms. 
By the same token, outbound FDI policy should acknowledge the benefits of 
home based MNEs concluding collaborative arrangements with foreign firms. 
This is the partnership proposition. 
7. FDI policy should take account of the increasing role of multi-stakeholder 
initiatives in democratic societies, such as those of consumer groups, labour 
unions, and a variety of non-government organisations, which are affecting 
the pattern, organization and ownership of economic activity. This is the 
stakeholder proposition. 
8. Both inward and outward FDI policy need to acknowledge that globalization 
often widens the locational options of MNEs. This being so, it is all the more 
critical for each country to identify and promote its unique and sustainable 
economic and social advantages, as well as taking account of the FDI and 
related policies of likely competitor countries. This is the leveraging proposition. 
9. As countries move upwards along their development paths, the need for an 
integrated policy towards outward and inward FDI, becomes more imperative. 
Each has its own specific (but related) role to play in enhancing the 
productivity of indigenous factor endowments, and their adaptation to 
structural change. This is the integration proposition. 
10. FDI policy should take note of the trend towards more subsidiarity in 
decisions taken by both foreign and their own MNEs, and especially a 
growing appreciation by them of the value of localised resources and 
capabilities, and of social and cultural preferences. This is the localization 
proposition. 
11. While FDI policy – and particularly investment incentives – should be as 
transparent, general and consistent as possible, there may be merit in taylor-
making the contents of particular aspects of this policy to target certain types 
of FDI or MNEs. This is the targeting proposition. 
 
Figure 3 combines these various drivers and determinants of FDI policy into one 
diagram. As I have already suggested, the prioritisation and importance of each is 
likely to vary according to type of FDI, the strategies of individual MNEs, and the 
specific institutional and other characteristics of particular countries or regions, as they 
might affect attitudes and actions towards globalisation and economic development. 
In so doing, I believe both inward and outward FDI policy can make an 
important contribution to upgrading the competitiveness of indigenous firms and 
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advancing the comparative dynamic advantage of countries. 
 
Figure 3. Proposed Ingredients of FDI Policy 
2. Assessing likely effects of 
fdi
3.Structural transformation
4.Institutional focus
5.Capability upgrading
6. Partnership/Networks
7. Multiple stakeholders
FDI Policy 2005*
8. Leveraging L-specific 
advantages
9. Integrated approach to 
outward/inward fdi
1.Holistic approach
11.Targeting specific types 
of fdi
10.Subsidiarity/Localization 
needs.
 
*Such policy will vary according to (a) type of FDI & strategy of individual MNEs, (b) 
country/region specific characteristics affecting attitudes towards globalisation and economic 
development. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
What then may we conclude from this paper? First, that all countries – both 
developed and developing - should consider globalisation as an opportunity and 
challenge both to better promote the kind of economic and social change they desire, 
and to enhance their ownership of that change.  
Second, that, as development proceeds, inward and then increasingly outward, 
FDI can play an important positive role in meeting these opportunities and challenges, 
provided that the appropriate societal institutions and the policies of national governments are in place 
and working well. Third that, in framing and implementing FDI policies, there are 
several issues specific to the needs of the global economy in the 21st century which 
must be given high priority. 
Let me finally offer you three statements which, though seemingly obvious, I 
believe should guide any actions taken by national governments and international 
investing agencies seeking to gain the most from being part of the global economy. 
 
1. While both outward and inward FDI can help a country to benefit 
from globalization and foster economic growth and development, it 
should not be regarded as a panacea for its economic ills. With a few 
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exceptions, a country’s long term economic success and social welfare 
must rest on its ability to upgrade its indigenous resources and 
capabilities, and the competitiveness of its own firms. In pursuance of 
this objective, I believe that it is essential that countries such as Korea 
should retain full ownership of their critical institutions, their cultural 
identities and their belief systems 
2. History and geography matter. Both policy makers and indigenous 
firms should seek to learn from their own past successes and failures, 
and from the experiences of other countries and firms most similar to 
those of their own. However, they should not be bound by, or slaves to, 
those successes, failures and experiences. In the light of the perceived 
contribution of both inward and outward FDI to economic 
development, and of the axiological changes now occurring in the 
global human environment, they should (a) devise the macroeconomic 
and microeconomic strategies most suited to their unique particular 
situations and needs; and (b) ensure that they have the appropriate 
institutional mechanisms to efficiently and sympathetically implement 
these strategies. 
3. Both public and private organizations – not to mention individuals 
and private interest groups - should be cautious about making easy 
generalizations about the economic and social consequences of FDI. 
Not only will these effects vary according to the motive for, and kind 
of, inward and outward FDI undertaken, but also to the values, 
attitudes and actions of the societal stakeholders most affected by it, 
and to the strategies and policies pursued by the home and host 
governments most concerned. 
 
One final observation. In a speech given in London in February 2005, the UK 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown set out his vision for the UK to become 
one of the most successful enterprise countries in the world. This vision was couched 
in the form of a challenge to Britain’s corporations and workforce to (I quote) ‘reform, 
liberalise, meet and master the high-tech value added competition.’ To do so, he 
argued, the UK needed to become world leaders in education, science and creativity 
and to offer both foreign owned and domestic firms the most attractive location to do 
business and to create new businesses. The result of a more enterprising Britain, he 
suggested, would not only be the creation of new wealth but, equally important, the 
best way of opening up a life enhancing opportunity for all, and particularly for those 
most economically deprived.  
If this vision is to be embraced by the UK - the pioneer of the first Industrial 
Revolution - , how much more so is it of relevance for the important emerging players 
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- such as Korea - in today’s global economy. I for one strongly believe that both 
inward and outward FDI - and indeed, FDI policy - has a critical role to play in this 
highly worthwhile task. 
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